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Abstract: 
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System) systems were originally created 
to be deployed in non-networked environments. Therefore they lack of adequate security against 
Internet-based threats and cyber-related forensics. In recent years, SCADA systems have undergone a 
series of changes that might increase the risks to which they are exposed. Among these risks it can be 
observed that its increased connectivity may permit remote controls over the Internet, or the 
incorporation of general purpose tools, thus incorporating already known vulnerabilities of these. Any 
cyber-attack against SCADA systems demands forensic investigation to understand the cause and 
effects of the intrusion or disruption on such systems. However, a SCADA system has a critical 
requirement of being continuously operational and therefore a forensic investigator cannot turn off the 
SCADA system for data acquisition and analysis. This paper leads to the creation of a high level 
software application capable of detecting critical situations like abnormal changes of sensor reads, 
illegal penetrations, failures, physical memory content and abnormal traffic over the communication 
channel. One of the main challenges is to achieve the development of a tool that has minimal impact 
over the SCADA resources, during the data acquisition process. 
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Introduction 
The security of SCADA systems is especially relevant in the field of Critical Infrastructure. A 
failure of critical infrastructure could have direct impact for society to the extent of affecting entire 
nations and their environment. 
 Any government network infrastructure or industrial based SCADA (Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition) or DCS (Distributed Control Systems), designed to automate, monitor and 
control critical physical processes, including manufacturing and testing, electric transmission, fuel and 
water transport, is subject to potential attacks. 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition comprise all application solutions that collect 
measurements and operational data from locally and remotely controlled equipment. The data is 
processed to determine if the values are within tolerance levels and, if necessary, take corrective 
action to maintain stability and control. Its basic architecture comprises a centralized server or server 
farm, RTU (Remote Terminal Units) or PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) to manage devices; 
consoles from which operators monitor and control equipment and machinery. 
SCADA systems were originally created to be deployed in non-networked environments. 
Therefore they lack of adequate security against Internet-based threats and cyber-related forensics. 
Most industrial plants now employ networked process historian servers for storing process 
data and other possible business and process interfaces. The adoption of Ethernet and transmission 
control protocol/ Internet protocol TCP/IP for process control networks and wireless technologies 
such as IEEE 802.x and Bluetooth has further reduced the isolation of SCADA networks (Zhu, 
Anthony & Sastry, 2011). 
In recent years, SCADA systems have undergone a series of changes that might increase the 
risks to which they are exposed. Among these risks it can be observed that its increased connectivity 
may permit remote controls over the Internet, or the incorporation of general purpose tools, thus 
incorporating already known vulnerabilities of these. 
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SCADA systems, in particular, perform vital functions in national critical infrastructures, such 
as electric power distribution, oil and natural gas distribution, water and waste-water treatment, and 
transportation systems. They are also at the core of health-care devices, weapons systems, and 
transportation management. The disruption of these control systems could have a significant impact 
on public health, safety and lead to large economic losses (Cardenas, Amin, Huang, Lin & Sastry 
2011).  
As a consequence, there is an increasing interest in the security/forensic research community 
on SCADA systems. This is mostly due to the heightened focus of governments worldwide on 
protecting their critical infrastructures, including SCADA systems (Ahmed, Obermeier & Naedele, 
David, Chaugule & Campbell, 2012).  
Securing SCADA systems is a critical aspect of Smartgrid security. As sophisticated attacks 
continue to target industrial systems, the focus should be on planning and developing new security 
techniques that will adapt to the SCADA environment and protocols (Rodrigues, Best & Pendse, 
2011). 
Immediate needs identified in this area include the collection of evidence in the absence of 
persistent memory, hardware-based capture devices for control systems network audit trails, 
honeypots for control systems as part of the investigatory process, radio frequency forensics and 
intrusion detection systems for SCADA control systems (Nance, Hay & Bishop, 2009). However, 
post-mortem analysis tools require the investigator to shut down the system to inspect the contents of 
disks and identify artifacts of interest. This process breaks network connections and unmounts 
encrypted disks causing significant loss of potential evidence and possible disruption of critical 
systems (Chan & Venkataraman, 2010).  
Computer forensics relies on log events for searching evidence of a security incident. 
However, the massive amounts of generated events along a lack of standardize logs complicate the 
analyst tasks (Herrerias & Gomez, 2007). 
Digital forensics investigators are experiencing an increase in both the number and 
complexity of cases that require their attention. Most current digital forensic tools are designed to run 
on a single workstation, with the investigator issuing queries against copies of the acquired data 
evidence.  With current generation tools, the single workstation models works reasonably  well and 
allows  tolerable  case  turnaround times for small  forensic targets (for example < 40GB). For much 
larger targets, these tools are too slow to provide acceptable turnaround times (Richard & Roussev, 
2006). 
The challenge, however, is to mitigate the vulnerabilities that occur once a networked device 
becomes accessible from the internet. Attacks ranging from DDoS to backdoor intrusion are possible 
on industrial networks and power and SCADA systems. Although network firewalls can stop a 
significant amount of malicious traffic, there are several techniques hackers can use to bypass these 
security devices. The complexity of the infrastructure can make it difficult to detect malicious 
behavior (Rodrigues et al., 2011). 
Research Problem  
Any cyber-attack against SCADA systems demands forensic investigation to understand the 
cause and effects of the intrusion or disruption on such systems. However, a SCADA system has a 
critical requirement of being continuously operational and therefore a forensic investigator cannot 
turn off the SCADA system for data acquisition and analysis. Current forensic tools are limited by 
their inability to preserve the hardware and software state of a system during investigation.  
Research Goal and Target  
Process control systems (SCADA Systems) generated much discussion as an area that the 
security community recognizes as a security threat, but not yet perceived by industry to be as much of 
a threat. As a result, this field lags behind most technical fields in the area of security (Nance, Hay & 
Bishop, 2009). 
Study and research security vulnerabilities related to networked Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, in order to develop a forensic computing model to support incident 
response and digital evidence collection process. Forensic investigation can play a vital role in a 
protection strategy for SCADA systems and may assist in the prosecution of attackers, but also in a 
deep analysis of the underlying SCADA IT system, for example, in the case of non-malicious events 
such as malfunctioning hard disks or other hardware. However the critical nature of SCADA systems 
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and the 24/7 availability requirement entails forensic investigators spending as little time on a live 
SCADA system as possible, necessarily performing live data acquisition and then subsequent offline 
analysis of the acquired data (Ahmed et al. 2010). 
Relevance and Significance  
In the last years there has been an increasing interest in the security of process control and 
SCADA systems. Furthermore, recent computer attacks such as the Stuxnet worm, have shown there 
are parties with the motivation and resources to effectively attack control systems (Cardenas et al., 
2011) 
SCADA systems are deeply ingrained in the fabric of critical infrastructure sectors. These 
computerized real-time process control systems, over geographically dispersed continuous 
distribution operations, are increasingly subject to serious damage and disruption by cyber means due 
to their standardization and connectivity to other networks (Zhu & Anthony, 2011). 
In recent times it has been noticed that hackers implement newer techniques to launch attacks 
that can evade traditional security devices. It is therefore important to secure the SCADA systems 
from process related threats (Rodrigues et al., 2011). 
Compromising such a system with intrusion attacks can lead not only to high financial loses 
but, more importantly, to the endangerment of public safety. The danger is even higher considering 
that critical infrastructures are not immune to these threats and that they may be potentially more 
vulnerable than common information technology systems. Hence intrusion protection for critical 
infrastructures is an obvious need (Linda, Vollmer & Manic, 2009). 
Reliability of many SCADA systems is not only dependent on safety, but also on security. 
Recent attacks against SCADA systems, by sophisticated malware, demands forensic investigation to 
understand the cause and effects of the intrusion on such systems so that their cyber defense can be 
improved.  
A SCADA system has a critical requirement of being continuously operational and therefore a 
forensic investigator cannot turn off the SCADA system for data acquisition and analysis. In this case, 
live forensics is a viable solution for digital investigation in SCADA systems (Ahmed et al., 2012). 
In real life, logs are rarely processed by stakeholders due to 1) the large number of entries 
generated daily by systems and 2) a general lack of security skills and resources (time) 
(Hadziosmanovic et al.,2011). However, the use of the classical post-mortem analysis approach is 
becoming problematic especially for large-scale investigations involving a network of computers. In 
addition, the amount of time available for processing this data is often limited (Su & Wang, 2011). 
Review of Literature 
A substantial body of research exists in the area of forensics models for live acquisition over 
SCADA systems. Related research work is discussed on this section. 
There is a growing need for systems that allow not only the detection of complex attacks, but 
after the fact understanding of what happened (Tang & Daniels, 2012). 
Several researches address threats in SCADA systems. For the identification of threats, 
authors typically use questionnaires and interviews. To detect anomalous behavior, authors use 
approaches based on inspecting network traffic, validating protocol specifications and analyzing data 
readings. Process-related attacks typically cannot be detected by observing network traffic or protocol 
specifications in the system. To detect such attacks one needs to analyze data passing through the 
system, and include a semantic understanding of user actions (Hadziosmanovic et al.,2011). 
A group of researchers who met at the Colloquium for Information Systems Security 
Education (CISSE 2008) to brainstorm ideas for the development of a research for Digital Forensic, 
concluded that actual SCADA systems are potentially more vulnerable to attack and more likely to 
need associated digital forensics capabilities. Unfortunately, most process control systems were not 
built to track their processes, but merely to control them. As a result, significant research and 
development categories were identified under this area, including among the most important: 
mechanism form the collection of evidence in the absence of persistent Memory and hardware-based 
capture devices for control (Nance, 2009). Figure 1 shows the list of topics in need for further 
development. It can be noticed that areas for Live Acquisition and Control Systems. 
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Figure 1: Research Topics for Digital Forensics 
Chen & Abu-Nimeh (2011), developed a deep research over the case of Suxnet malware. 
According their report, this was the first malware written exclusively to attack SCADA platform.  
Stuxnet experience has shown that isolation from the Internet isn't an effective defense, and an 
extremely motivated attacker might have an unexpected combination of inside knowledge, advanced 
skills, and vast resources. Existing technologies would have difficulty defending against this caliber of 
attack (Chen & Abu-Nimeh, 2011). Therefore the need of new forensics methods that goes beyond the 
traditional prevention mechanism. 
Ahmed, Obermeier & Naedele, David, Chaugule & Campbell (2012), propose a forensic 
mechanism denominated Live Forensics as a viable solution for SCADA systems.  Live data 
acquisition involves acquiring both volatile data (such as the contents of physical memory) and non-
volatile data (such as data stored on a hard disk). It is different from traditional dead disk acquisition, 
which involves bringing the system offline before the acquisition, where all volatile data is lost. 
However, despite the importance of live data acquisition, it is still unclear how contemporary 
live data acquisition tools should be run on a SCADA system so that they minimize risk to SCADA 
system services (Ahmed et al., 2011). 
Aldenstein (2006) established that the possibility of implementing live forensics over SCADA 
systems relies on the capability of the operating system to provide the list of running processes. 
Therefore, he recognized the need for tools capable of examining the raw memory of a machine. 
These tools are analogous to the static tools that open the raw disk device and impose the file system 
structure on it to extract files, directories, and metadata (Adelstein, 2006). 
Sutherland et al (2008), performed exploratory studies for live forensics within Windows 
operating systems environment and also determined the need for more invasive tools that allows 
better access to information related to memory, network and system activity were assessed to 
determine the impact on the file system, system registry, memory and the usage of DLLs. 
Hadziosmanovic et al. (2011) proposed a tool-assisted approach to address process related 
threats. They presented an experimental study where SCADA threats that unlikely to happen or that 
does not occur on a systematic manner are detected and logged for investigation. An example could 
be when an attacker manages to get valid user credentials and performs disruptive actions against the 
process. However this effort was limited to post-mortem log analysis containing data for single event 
operations and does cover anomalous command process sequences.  Likewise, it was determined that 
an attacker might gain unauthenticated remote access to devices and change their data set points. This 
can cause devices to fail at a very low threshold value or an alarm not to go off when it should. 
Another possibility is that the attacker, after gaining unauthenticated access, could change the 
operator display values so that when an alarm actually goes off, the human operator is unaware of it. 
This could delay the human response to an emergency which might adversely affect the safety of 
people in the vicinity of the plant (Zhu & Anthony, 2011). 
SCADA systems are increasingly commonly being attached to networks, and typically offer 
no persistent storage for logging of network activity. The challenge for the digital forensic research 
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community is to develop methods to allow an investigator to determine how these devices interacted 
with the network during a time period of interest (Nance, Hay & Bishop, 2009). 
There is continuing interest in researching generic security architectures and strategies for 
managing SCADA and process control systems. Documentation from various countries on IT security 
does now begin to recommendations for security controls for (federal) information systems which 
include connected process control systems. Little or no work exists in the public domain which takes a 
big picture approach to the issue of developing a generic or generalizable approach to SCADA and 
process control system forensics (Sly & Stinikova, 2009). 
Collection of adequate records or logs of events that happened near incident time is crucial for 
successful investigation. Logging capabilities of SCADA systems are geared towards discovering and 
diagnosing process disturbances, not security incidents, and are thus often not adequate for forensic 
investigation (Fabro & Cornelius, 2008) 
Kilpatrick et al (2008) developed an architecture based on the Modbus TCP (Transmission 
Control Protocol) using two control devices and one HMI (Human Machine Interface) station. This 
architecture comprised two agents and a central warehouse. Various agents were deployed over the 
SCADA network. These agents captured network traffic containing real time data and stored them 
into the warehouse. Relational databases query mechanisms were used in the event of a forensic 
investigation. However, Ahmed et al (2011) established that state of the art forensic analysis tools do 
not support the unique features of diverse SCADA environments, which include supporting SCADA 
protocols and numerous SCADA applications’ proprietary log formats etc. Thus plugins or modules 
for contemporary forensic tools need to be developed to augment the forensic analysis in SCADA 
systems. 
Nehimbe & Nehibe (2012) proposed a timed series methodology to analyze forensic logs. 
During their research they concluded that actual for forensic tools may not necessarily generate the 
needed results. Due to two basic limitations on these tools: Some of them only have recovery and 
imaging capabilities and some intrusion analysis tools are flawed in terms of how they analyze 
intrusion logs. 
Hunt & Slay (2010) proposed an approach named security information event management 
(SIEM) with the purpose to provide a tool that allows any networked system to auto adapt itself based 
on forensic logging. Their works showed that a SIEM system is an ideal point at which to store log 
data emanating from security devices and the point at which forensic logging needs to occur.  
However, although they were able to achieve the implementation of forensically sound log files in 
some systems; their approach is by no means universal. They concluded that their works still falls 
short of addressing the core domain of real-time forensically sound adaptive security. 
With the purpose of rebuilding an attack scenario Herreria & Gomez (2007), proposed a log 
correlation model to support the evidence search process in a forensic investigation. In this work, they 
proposed a system composed by a set of agents in order to collect, filter, and to normalize events 
coming from diverse log files. Events may come from systems logs, application logs, and security 
logs. Once events are joined together in the same place and under the same format, they are sent to a 
correlation engine. The engine compares and processes the events in a global fashion in order to 
follow all actions taken by the attacker (Herrerias & Gomez, 2007). 
Su & Wang (2011) developed a formula using probability theory and mathematical statistics 
to quantitatively calculate the degree of memory change on a live system. Their conclusions states 
that since the live memory state frequently changes is natural limitation for the purpose of live 
forensics. In their experiments they tried to restore to the same system state each time, however, the 
real state has been changed after one or two seconds. Therefore, they were only able determine and 
approximate of the system memory in every repeated process. 
Further work is required to assess tools over various operating systems. This would be of 
value to the forensic investigator, but the way memory is handled and its analysis varies greatly 
between Windows Service packs let alone other operating systems; as a result the area of memory 
forensics is deeply complex and requires a significant amount of time and effort invested by the 
forensic examiner to begin to comprehend how memory works in modern Operating Systems 
(Sutherland, Evans, Tryfonas & Blyth, 2008). 
Other research approaches are related to autonomic attack detection and response. Cardenas et 
al. (2011) showed that by incorporating a physical model of the system they were able to identify the 
1st Annual International Interdisciplinary Conference, AIIC 2013, 24-26 April, Azores, Portugal               - Proceedings- 
258 
 
most critical sensors and attacks.  They also proposed the use of automatic response mechanisms 
based on estimates of the state of the system. However, they concluded that this methodology might 
be problematic, especially when the response to a false alarm is costly (Which could be the case for 
SCADA environment). As a result their model should be considered as a temporary solution before a 
human investigates the alarm. 
Approach 
While there have been a good number of research efforts investigating the suitability of 
forensics mechanism for SCADA, this work would be different in that it is intended to develop an 
investigation into what is required to develop a forensic computing model to support incident 
response and digital evidence collection process, without interfering with the “always running” 
condition of SCADA platforms. The intended approach is an extension of the works from Ahmed et al. 
(2011), who proposed a forensic mechanism denominated Live Forensics as a viable solution for 
SCADA systems.  Live data acquisition involves acquiring both volatile data (such as the contents of 
physical memory) and non-volatile data (such as data stored on a hard disk). It is different from 
traditional dead disk acquisition, which involves bringing the system offline before the acquisition, 
where all volatile data is lost.  
From a forensic perspective, a SCADA system can be viewed in different layers based on the 
connectivity of the various SCADA components and their network connectivity with other networks 
such as the Internet.  
 
 
Figure 2: Layer Model for SCADA 
The lowest layer represents the physical elements designed to interact directly with the 
industrial hardware or machinery. These devices are connected via bus network. Layer 1 receives 
electrical input signals with are decoded as a bit streams over a standard network protocols. The result 
is transferred to the uppers layers form analysis and controlling response. Layer 3 and above, 
represents the enterprise network which is also interconnected to the Supervisory systems. At this 
stage all traffic containing database content and applications supporting the business logics for the 
operation is managed. As stated by Amehd et al, (2010), live forensic analysis for the SCADA system 
must focus on the Layers 0, 1 and 2. 
The initial approach has the intention of developing a forensic watch dog by means of a finite 
state automaton that would function as an agent that is constantly listening SCADA events. When any 
particular event is sensed, the input values are read and compared to a set of predefined rules in order 
to decide the change of state. Figure 2 represents the proposed automaton model. 
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Figure 3: Finite State Automaton as SCADA Live Monitor 
This two state automaton or agent constantly monitors the state of the SCADA system, 
including measures from: System Variables, Sensor Tags, Network Traffic and Command Executions. 
These values are checked against a set of behavioral rules. If a read is detected to be above the normal 
range, the agent automatically switches to Forensic mode and initiate the logging of forensic 
information. Ideally it would need a separate backup system to continuously dump the abnormal 
lectures from the SCADA tags and creates a record of this event appending all the information 
available about the system state. Including, but not limited to: CPU load, sensor names, sensor values, 
state of the physical memory, state of the virtual memory, state of the networking variables, state of 
mounted disk and network drives, list of active process in memory including name, executable name, 
working directory, command line, user name, user ids and group ids, threads, connections, file 
descriptors, etc. The information logged would be exclusively related to the period of time of the 
anomaly. Once the system start reading normal values, it switches back to Forensic Monitor and stop 
logging.  
Normally a SCADA system reads every sensor or control registry on the system. These 
registries are known as tags and the logging frequency can vary from a read every second or even 
every 300 milliseconds. A typical SCADA system can have up to 40,000 tags. A system of such 
magnitude can generate approximately 400GB of data for every 24 hour period of operation. This 
calculation is based estimating an average size of 120 bytes per record. It can be seen, that the live 
acquisition is just part of the challenge. Dealing with vast amounts of data needs to be considered. 
These volumes requires manipulation by means of database query processors and moreover, require a 
fast capture and writing process that must be able to: (1) keep up with the logging process at the same 
time that new data comes into the system; and (2) all this must be done without incorporating 
additional workload over the monitored SCADA system. In other words, needs to be accomplished in 
a non-invasive manner. 
Another challenge imposed to the intended solution is that SCADA system components can 
be found running on legacy hardware and operating systems. In such cases, a SCADA system 
provides limited system resources for data acquisition and therefore demands lightweight data 
acquisition tools and the gathering process might not represent a large resource consumer. However 
the data conversion process, if a relational database would be implemented for a better data analysis, 
would requires specialized hardware to reduce the processing time and speed up files conversion and 
querying processes. 
Another important aspect from this experiment that would be suitable for further development 
is that current forensic analysis tools do not provide a standard support for the variety of SCADA 
hardware versions, protocols and log formats. Therefore, we have an interesting opportunity to 
expand this experiment with the development of plugins and applications and interface layers in order 
to increase the number of SCADA forensic tools as an expansion of the works of Hadziosmanovic et 
al., (2011), who stated that despite the fact that there are several vendors, system architectures in 
various SCADA systems are similar and the terminology is interchangeable. 
In conclusion, future work leads to the creation of a high level software application capable of 
detecting critical situations like abnormal changes of sensor reads, illegal penetrations, failures, 
physical memory content and abnormal traffic over the communication channel. One of the main 
challenges is to achieve the development of a tool that has minimal impact over the SCADA 
resources, during the data acquisition process. In previous exercises it was observed that the processes 
for acquiring low level information, such as processes or memory information does not represents an 
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extensive load on the actual system that is processing the task. However, it is expected that the 
amount of demanded resources increase as the number of SCADA tags and the frequency of logging 
increases. Therefore on real live SCADA system, the acquisition process could be competing for 
resources that should be available for the normal operation of the SCADA systems. 
Barriers and Resources 
From the literature review it can be determined multiple barriers and issues that could be 
anticipated for the development of this work. The next section presents a summary of the know 
limitations and challenges determined by previous research efforts on this field. 
Forensic data gathered from a live system can provide evidence that is not available in a static 
disk image. Live forensics also operates with different constraints—specifically, the evidence 
gathered represents a snapshot of a dynamic system that cannot be reproduced at a later date. 
Standards for acceptance are evolving, and legal precedents are still being established (Adelstein, 
2006).  
Given that volatile data in a running system changes continuously, Ahmed et al., (2011) 
established two main challenges involved during live data acquisition over operational SCADA 
systems: (1) Live data acquisition needs to be performed as quickly as possible after an incident in 
order to capture any traces of the incident on volatile data before the processes or services on the 
running system overwrite useful data; (2) Cryptographic hash of the actual evidence on the 
compromised system and its acquired copy, which is used for all the examination and analysis. If, 
however, the compromised system remains live, the state of the data may change between the copying 
and the hash calculation, rendering hashing ineffective as an integrity check (Ahmed et al., 2011). 
From a forensic standpoint, modifying the original system memory state is unavoidable, 
therefore, it is needed that changing as little as possible on the process of collecting live forensics. For 
a real live forensics case, it should content digital forensics that collected by the forensic tools, the 
analysis and evaluation of the uncertainty. However, it is difficult to measure how much of the 
volatile memory is modified by a forensics tool. Moreover, it is difficult (if not impossible) to 
calculate the extent of the memory’s impact caused by a running process on the volatile memory. So, 
measuring the extent of the volatile memory changes caused by running a live forensic tool becomes 
more and more important (Su & Wan, 2011). 
Because the architecture of production operating systems prevents applications from 
accessing kernel memory and storage devices without using the kernel, kernel-based rootkits will 
always be a threat to live analysis. Future directions in live analysis techniques involve the use of 
specialized hardware to collect the raw memory and storage data for a dead analysis (Carrier, 2006). 
Research has shown that an attacker with control of the target system can manipulate memory 
mappings so that the CPU and devices on the PCI or Firewire buses don’t necessarily get the same 
view of memory. In such cases, attempts to acquire the memory’s contents could crash the target 
system or enable the attacker to mask sections of memory without that masking being apparent to the 
investigator (Hay, Bishop & Nance, 2009). 
Furthermore, factors like the continuous availability demand, time-criticality, constrained 
computation resources on edge devices, large physical base, wide interface between digital and analog 
signals, social acceptance including cost effectiveness and user reluctance to change, legacy issues 
and so on make SCADA system a peculiar security engineering task (Zhu & Anthony, 2011). 
Finally, no matter how well the simulations and models emulate a possible solution, any given 
conclusion needs to be tested over a real SCADA systems. Real SCADA systems are expensive to 
build and thus require significant research funding. Access to sample information or security failure 
scenarios could be difficult because the critical nature of SCADA systems demands the owners and 
operators not share any information about their system. 
Conclusion and Expected Contributions 
Applying traditional information security mechanism directly to SCADA systems is not 
possible. SCADA systems cannot afford non-deterministic delays in performance, security controls 
that require a lot of memory, block access for safety or relatively long intermediate processes. 
Security measures that can be applied to SCADA systems should consider this special operating 
paradigm. 
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Process-related attacks typically cannot be detected by observing network traffic or protocol 
specifications in the system. To detect such attacks one needs to analyze data passing through the 
system, and include a semantic understanding of user actions (Hadziosmanovic et al., 2011). 
In conclusion, there is no generic model for understanding the forensic computing processes 
necessary to gather digital evidence from Process Control and SCADA systems. Therefore, the need 
for developing a forensic computing model to support incident response and digital evidence 
collection process is justified. 
As a consequence this work could help to improve critical infrastructure protection and 
provide appropriate tools that could be used for dealing with incident responses and forensics analysis 
over interconnected SCADA systems.  
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